The contemporary electrical power infrastructure is exposed to new types of threats. The cause of such threats is related to the large number of new vulnerabilities and architectural weaknesses introduced by the extensive use of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in such complex critical systems. The power grid interconnection with the Internet exposes the grid to new types of attacks, such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) or Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. When addressing this situation the usual cyber security technologies are prerequisite, but not sufficient. To counter evolved and highly sophisticated threats such as the APT or DDoS, state-of-the-art technologies including Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) systems, extended Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) and Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) are required. Developing and deploying extensive ICT infrastructure that supports wide situational awareness and allows precise command and control is also necessary. In this paper the results of testing the Situational Awareness Network (SAN) designed for the energy sector are presented. The purpose of the tests was to validate the selection of SAN components and check their operational capability in a complex test environment. During the tests' execution appropriate interaction between the components was verified.
Introduction
Today the electrical grids take advantage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and they are often interconnected with the Internet. This exposes them to a completely new type of threats, namely cyber-threats, from which Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) or Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, pose a specifically serious challenge in protection of the electrical infrastructure. The most exposed components of the Polish Power System are SCADA systems in substations and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) in power plants.
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Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are dedicated attacks able to persistently target a specific entity and to cause a specific effect, such as an interruption to the power supply [1, 2] . DDoS attacks, on the other hand, attempt to delay, block or corrupt the communication in the grid [3] . Stuxnet [4] was the first wide manifestation of malware that was specifically designed to attack networked industrial control systems in facilities such as gas pipelines or power plants. Detected for the first time in 2010, Stuxnet is a cyber worm able to infect process control servers and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and alter physical processes in order to sabotage the targeted facility. Later studies revealed that Stuxnet was not the first threat of that type. In fact that it had its precursor called Flame that was undetected until 2012 [5] .
To counter the evolved, highly sophisticated threats, advanced cyber security technologies are required, such as Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, application whitelisting, and Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) [1, 6] . Developing and deploying Situation Awareness Networks (SANs) with SIEM software will improve situational awareness and will allow for better control and faster response to threats [7] .
Such a Situation Awareness Network is being developed in project DEnSeK (Distributed Energy Security Knowledge) [8] . The project aims at improving the security and resilience of the new energy infrastructure against cyber-threats. It will provide a platform for the security knowledge exchange between companies of the European energy sector. It shall result in establishing a European Energy ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Centre) which will enable interactive and real-time knowledge and information sharing between all involved parties [8] .
In this paper the results of testing the Situational Awareness Network (SAN) designed for the energy sector are presented. The purpose of the tests was to validate the selection of SAN components and check their operational capability and interoperability in a complex test environment.
Cyber security in the electrical power infrastructure
The contemporary electrical grid due to the intensified use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is exposed to new types of cyber-threats. The most vulnerable components of the Polish Power System are Industrial Control Systems (ICS) which include SCADA systems in substations and Distributed Control Systems in power plants.
Cyber security may is defined as the ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks [9] and is inextricably linked to information security i.e. the state of information when its confidentiality, integrity and availability are preserved [9, 10] .
Whereas [10] This definition applies to Information and Communication Technologies in general. Industrial Control Systems (ICS), however, have characteristics that make them very different from traditional information processing systems. There are two fundamental factors which drive most of the others: ICS systems have different priorities and imply risks with a much broader scope and impact. ICS were designed to meet tight performance and reliability requirements which are not typical in a conventional ICT environment. At the same time, many of these ICS serve to control and monitor very critical processes, such as nuclear power generation. This means that the risks include impact on the health and safety of human lives, serious damage to the environment, production losses, impact to a nation's economy, etc.
These differences influence the fact how the systems should be protected and what priorities must be assigned in the protection process. In result the risk management objectives for the two types of systems are not the same (see Figure 1 ).
The most important differences between ICT systems and ICS are described below.
Performance requirements
ICT systems are normally non-real-time systems, where high data throughput is demanded (and available) and where high delay and jitter may be acceptable in data being communicated as long as data is consistent. On the other hand, ICS may need to operate in real-time and therefore delay/jitter is not acceptable. Throughput is not so important, and as a result the underlying communication infrastructure may be limited in this aspect. [11] 
Availability requirements
Outages of ICS are not acceptable in most cases and therefore components redundancy is common practice. Moreover, many control systems are not easily stopped or started without affecting production. This means that common IT system practices such as rebooting are not acceptable. [11] 
Priority
Availab ility 
Risk management requirements
In traditional IT systems information confidentiality and integrity are the main concern. For ICS systems human safety, environmental impacts and the process itself (loss of equipment/production) are the main concerns. For this reason, from the three fundamental characteristics of computer security, availability and integrity are the priorities for ICS. [11] Time-Critical machine-human interaction ICS system response to human interaction is very critical. Requiring password authentication should not hamper or interfere with emergency actions. [11] System operation Legacy systems are vulnerable to resource unavailability and timing disruptions. Control networks are often more complex and their operation require a different level of expertise (e.g. are typically managed by control engineers). Software and hardware applications are more difficult to upgrade and many systems do not have desirable security features (e.g. encryption, error logging, password protection, etc.) and it may be difficult to include them since they are resource-constrained systems. [11] Change management Software updates on ICS systems need to be thoroughly tested by the vendor and end user before being implemented and ICS outages often must be planned and scheduled days/weeks in advance. Moreover, many ICS systems utilize older versions of operating systems that are no longer supported. [11] There are many challenges related to the protection of Industrial Controls Systems and ICT in the electrical infrastructure. For more details an interested reader may refer to [11] [12] [13] [14] .
Security Information and Event Management Systems in Situation Awareness

Situation Awareness
Various definitions of Situation Awareness (SA) [15, 16] exist, from which Tadda and Salerno adapt the one of Endsley [17] to the area of Cyber Situation Awareness: "Situation awareness is the perception of the elements of the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future to enable decision superiority." [10] Endsley provides a reference model for situation awareness, which includes the following levels: Perception is the lowest level of situational awareness. It provides information about the status and behaviour of relevant elements within the environment and represents it in a conceived form. Without a correct perception of important environmental elements, the probability of forming a distorted view of a situation increases dramatically [16] .
Comprehension of a situation is related to combining, interpreting, storing, and retaining information. It extends perception with the integration of multiple pieces of information and the determination of their relevance to established earlier objectives, which can result in inferring or deriving conclusions about the objectives. Comprehension provides a structured outlook of the current situation by determining the significance of objects and events. It links new information to already existing knowledge in order to produce a compound view of the situation as it evolves [16] .
Projection is the top level of situation awareness. It is defined as the ability to make predictions based on the outcome of comprehension (and perception) [16] .
McGuinness and Foy [18] extended the model by adding a fourth level, called Resolution, which aims at identifying an optimal path to achieve the desired state change to the current situation. Resolution is based on choosing a single course of action from a subset of available actions [18] .
Within the DEnSeK [19] project dashboard for the Situational Awareness Network operators was developed. This software visualises the data collected from a distributed set of sensors. At the time of test design dashboard was able to retrieve data from two sources. The first, network analyser Argus, was used to collect data about network traffic activity in protected network. The second is the OSSIM -comprehensive and open source security information and event management system. By treating OSSIM as an intermediate layer, the dashboard can be connected with a vast number of sensors, including the most popular IDS systems such as Snort and Suricata. The proposed in DEnSeK project Situational Awareness Network may be described as the three-tier architecture, presented in Figure 2 . The lowest tier, data tier consists of sensors such as Network and Host Intrusion Detection Systems, network monitors and analysers. OSSIM software works on logic tier, it collects and processes data from sensors and transmits them to the top layer. Finally at the presentation tier, the dashboard, after the further processing visualise the data as a user-friendly operator interface.
Testing environment
The tests were performed in the Cyber security Laboratory located in the ENEL Engineering and Research area of Livorno.
The laboratory aims at replicating the network architecture and the main process control components of a real power generation plant (Combine Cycle Gas Turbine). It was conceived, designed and developed for the testing and development of applications for process automation. From the ICT perspective, the network is layered in the same way as in a production plant, there are all the main components of industrial process control networks, including PLCs and Distributed Control System (DCS) from different vendors. From the industrial process perspective, the controlled process resembles the cold and warm water loops needed by a thermoelectric power plant. This physical process is equipped with field devices (sensors and actuators) such as pressure meters, valves, pumps, inverters, etc. controlled by the PLCs.
A power plant has a quite complex environment, comprising several kinds of systems, subsystems and components namely:
 The Field System, hosting all the PLC, RTU and sensors of the power plant,  The Process Control and Data Acquisition System (Process SCADA), which basically control the field system,  The Control Network, which provide the communication service among the whole Power Plant,  The Data Network, allowing to interconnect different Power Plants,  The Business (Offices) Network with the typical intranet applications,  The Demilitarised Zone where servers for sharing process related data are located.
These systems were reconstructed in the secure isolated (physically disconnected from any other networks) environment of the laboratory based on computer and network equipment, as well as SCADA devices set up over physical hydrologic installation -the Physical Power Plant Emulator (see Figure 3 and Table 1 ).
The information system of the power plant was reconstructed with very high fidelity. The identical subnetworks were created. All the key workstations of the power plant were copied in one-to-one relation. It means each of the workstations was reflected into one host of the simulation environment. Only stations of the Intranet were approximated with a lower number of hosts, but this was without loss of generality. In the reconstruction, the same network addresses were used, the same software installed (including the level of patching), the same configurations of firewalls applied etc. 
Table 1 Components of the Physical Power Plant Emulator
The schema of the network in laboratory is presented in Figure 4 .
Figure 4 Cyber Security Laboratory Schema
The laboratory is commonly used to carry out different cyber security tests, especially in the process control network, that help corporate security, ICT security and the different business units of ENEL to make informed decisions or take actions related to cyber security. Security tests include penetration tests, by leveraging the productionlike network layers of the laboratory, vulnerability assessments, which can be invasive since the laboratory process does not have any uptime requirement and can afford to fail, and for the validation of security solutions. The laboratory is also used to test security policies or technical guidelines before they are approved, and for testing security patches before their application into critical production environments, to verify that they do not cause malfunctioning of the SCADA equipment. Finally, also risk assessments benefit from feedback from the laboratory, especially about the impact and effectiveness of security approaches, procedures and technical solutions. 
Testing process
The aim of the performed tests was to verify whether the architecture and selected components prove their suitability in a complex power plant environment. For this purpose integrity tests were designed. Five test cases were prepared to check the SAN components interoperability. The following components were involved in the tests: In the first part of the testing process appropriate interaction between individual systems components was verified.
Execution of the first two test cases aimed at checking the dashboard operation with the Argus analyser as the data source. During these tests several problems were identified. All of them were related to the processing and visualisation of large amount of data specific to the power plant environment (e.g. Figure 5 ). Feedback from testing helped developers to identify and fix bugs.
During the second phase of testing (cases 3 and 4), the integration between Snort IDS and Ossim SIEM was verified. Since the both systems are mature Open Source projects their deployment and configuration was smooth. However testing in the large scale environment allowed identification of problems with communication between subnets. In a production environment sensors will be spread across regions, countries or even continent. It is therefore necessary to develop a method of communication with the central SIEM system. Finally, the last tests were devoted to the full integration of the SAN. Communication through all the tiers of the SAN (Figure 2 ) has been tested. The data collected by the sensors (Snort IDS) were transmitted to the SIEM system (OSSIM). There, based on the analysis and aggregation, alarms were raised and the dashboard was notified. The operator was informed about detected threats through the dashboard widgets. Tests have shown that the SAN architecture was designed correctly. Although there was number of problems and bugs system proved its usefulness in the complex test environment.
Conlusions
Risk associated with a cyber attack on the Polish energy infrastructure is slowly but steadily growing. This results on the one hand from the increasing dependence of the economy and society from electrical energy, on the other hand, from a gradually implemented ICT in energy sector. Situation Awareness Network supports the monitoring of infrastructure for early detection of threats and reducing their impact. In the DEnSeK project three-tier SAN platform was designed and implemented. Integration tests conducted in the complex and extensive ENEL Cyber Security Laboratory proved that the architecture and system components were properly selected and the system operates as intended.
